Credo offers tools and techniques to model and analyze highly reconfigurable distributed systems. In this paper, we present an integrated methodology to use the Credo tool suite. In this methodology, we advertise the use of top-down design, component-based modeling and compositional analysis to address the complexity of highly reconfigurable distributed systems. As a running example, we model a peer-to-peer file-sharing system and show how and when to apply the different modeling and analysis techniques of Credo.
Introduction
Current software development methodologies follow a component-based approach in modeling distributed systems. A major shortcoming of the existing methods is the lack of an integrated formalism to model highly reconfigurable distributed systems at different phases of design, i.e., systems that can be reconfigured in terms of a change to the network structure or an update to the components. Moreover, the high complexity of such systems requires tool-supported analysis techniques.
In this paper, we integrate the Credo tools and techniques into the software development life-cycle. We illustrate how and when they should be used during the design and analysis phases. Thus, software engineers can benefit by enriching their preferred methodology with the Credo tool suite.
The core of the Credo tool suite consists of two different executable modeling languages: Reo [1] is an executable dataflow language for high-level description of the dynamic reconfigurable network of connections between the components; Creol [2] Fig. 1 . Overview of modeling levels and analysis in Credo is an object-oriented modeling language, used to provide an abstract but executable model of the implementation of the individual components. Fig. 1 illustrates the relation between these modeling languages and their relation to existing programming languages. It also indicates the kind of analysis the Credo tool suite provides for each modeling language.
To support top-down design and compositional analysis, we make use of behavioral interfaces for the different abstraction levels of the design (cf. Fig. 2 ). At the top-level, behavioral interfaces are used to describe the dataflow between the components of a system. These interfaces abstract from the details of the internal object-oriented model of components. Instead they describe the kind of connections components use to communicate and interact. Credo provides as an Eclipse plug-in an integrated tool-suite, ECT (Eclipse Coordination Tools) [3] , to model and analyze the interactions between the components in a given network, e.g., absence of deadlock can be checked at this early stage of design. The functional behavior of the objects within a component is modeled in Creol.
The conformance between such a model of a component and its behavioral interface can be checked in Credo [4] . On the other hand, given an implementation of a component in a programming language like C, Credo also provides a technique to check for conformance between the implementation and the model [5, 6] . Both techniques are based on testing and use the behavioral interface as an abstract model to generate test cases and to control the execution of the test cases.
Furthermore, the Credo tool suite offers an automated technique for schedulability analysis of individual objects [7, 8] . We use the timed automata of Uppaal to model objects and their behavioral interfaces. Given a specification of a scheduling policy (e.g., shortest deadline first) for an object, we use Uppaal to analyze the object with respect to its behavioral interface in order to ensure that tasks are accomplished within their specified deadlines.
We illustrate the Credo methodology with an example. We model and analyze a file-sharing system with hybrid peer-to-peer architecture (like in Napster), where a central server keeps track of the data in every node. In Section 2, we develop the structural and behavioral interfaces for the components (nodes of the peer-to-peer system) and the network (the broker managing the dynamic connections between nodes); and prove our model of the network to be deadlock free. In Section 3, we give executable Creol models for the components and analyze them by means of simulation and testing for conformance both with respect to the behavioral interfaces and an implementation. We demonstrate schedulability analysis by analyzing the broker. Section 4 concludes the paper.
High-Level Dataflow Modeling
Reo [1] is a channel-based coordination model for component composition. As the formal semantics of Reo, we use constraint automata [9] . In Reo, a system consists of a set of components connected by a network. The network exogenously controls the data-flow between the components and may be dynamically reconfigured to connect different components. At this level of abstraction, only a facade is visible from each component. A facade consists of port and event declarations, and its abstract behavior is specified using constraint automata. In this paper, we do not go into the details of composing Reo channels for obtaining complex networks. Instead, we model the network behavior directly using constraint automata.
Components use ports to communicate with each other via the network. the network (as a cloud). Ports can be either inports or outports (implied by the direction of the triangles). By exogenous coordination, we mean that a component has no control on how its ports are connected. A component can only indirectly influence its connections by raising events. Events include requests/announcements of services, time-outs, or acknowledgments. These events can trigger reconfigurations of the context-aware network. The network includes a network manager that handles events and reconfigures the network according to the events. In this section, we model the nodes of the peer-to-peer system as the components. The network consists of the broker that manages the connections between the component ports. Each node has two sides, a client side and a server side. On each side, a pair of request and answer ports is needed. As a client, a node writes its request to cReq and expects the result on cAns. A component on its server side reads a request ('key' to some data) from sReq and writes the data corresponding to the given key to sAns. For two nodes to communicate, the broker has to connect the corresponding ports of the client and the server.
Structural Interface Description
To describe the facade of a component, we declare its ports and the events the component may raise. Below, we define two facades, ClientSide and ServerSide. The facade Peer inherits the ports and events declared in these two and adds another event that is needed when the two sides are combined. // a s y n c e v e n t 3 end
The network manager in a system does not keep a centralized account of all port bindings; these are locally stored at each component. A component cannot directly change its port bindings. Before using ports, the component must request a connection by raising an open session event. An event for closing the session implies that the ports are now safe to be disconnected. These events must provide the ports to be used in the session as parameters. In addition, they can have extra parameters, e.g., the 'open client session' event (written as openCS) guides the connection by providing the key it is looking for, and in return it is informed whether such a node is found.
Events are by default asynchronous. However, events expecting return values (e.g., open and close session events) should be declared to be synchronous (using the keyword sync event). All events raised by the components in a system have to be handled by the network. This has to be reflected in the structural interface description of the network.
Network.
We give the structural interface description of a particular network manager called Broker. The keyword networkmanager is used to identify such interfaces (and distinguish them from those characterizing component facades). The Credo methodology also distinguishes between the concept of a network manager and the network itself because a network in general consists of a network manager and additional coordination artifacts like channels, as described later in this section. The description of the Broker declares the event handlers that it provides. For each event handler, it specifies the facade (representing a component) from which the handled event originated using the keyword with. 
Behavioral Interface Description
The behavioral description for a component facade comprises of specifying the order of raising events and the port operations. This is modeled using constraint automata [9] . In these automata, we denote port operations by specifying the port names. The corresponding action (read or write) is understood from the port type (given in the structural facade description). Fig. 4 shows the behavioral specification for the facades in our example. As mentioned earlier, the port actions are surrounded by opening and closing session events in parts (a) and (b) of this figure. A server registers its data with the broker to initialize its operation. We opt for a simple scenario, i.e., each server or client handles only one request at a time. We also assume at this level of abstraction, that openCS is always successful, i.e., every data item searched for is available somewhere in the system.
The Peer facade inherits the behavior specified for ClientSide and ServerSide facades. The Peer facade additionally introduces extra behavior involving an update to the data stored at the broker. This automaton synchronizes with the ServerSide facade to make sure that an update cannot take place before the data is initally registered. Moreover, the data at the broker should be updated after receiving new information (on the ClientSide). This is modeled by synchronizing on the read operation on cAns.
Fig. 4. Behavioral interfaces for facades
In general, the behavior of the sub-type has to be a refinement of the behavior of its super-type [10] . This is achieved by computing the product of the automata describing the inherited behavior (ServerSide and ClientSide) and the automaton synchronizing them (Peer). In this product [9] the transitions of different automata are interleaved while those with common action names are synchronized.
Network
The Broker in a peer-to-peer system connects the ports and handles the events of the components.We show how to model the synchronization of a system consisting of a fixed number of components, say n, for some n > 0. The observable actions of the ith component (i ∈ {1, . . . , n}), i.e., the communications on its ports and its events, are denoted by openCS i , openSS i , closeCS i , closeSS i , cReq i , sReq i , cAns i , and sAns i . Synchronization of actions is naturally modeled in the following automata by a transition labeled with the participating actions.
For clarity, we start by different automata for the synchronization of ports and events. Synchronization between the ports of a pair of components i and j is described by the following automaton.
For each pair of components i and j, the following automaton synchronizes the events openCS i and openSS j to establish a connection between components i and j and the events closeCS i and closeSS j to release the connection again. These two consecutive synchronizations together thus model one session between the client of component i and the server of component j.
Combining the automata above models the port connections that need to be made in a session between each pair of components (shown below). The interleaving product of these combined automata for all pairs of components results in an automaton describing the behavioral interface of the Broker.
It should be noticed that interleaving allows for components to be involved in more than one session at a time. The synchronized product of the Broker automa-Immo Grabe, Mohammad Mahdi Jaghoori et al. ton with the component automata (from the previous subsection) finally describes the overall behavior of the system. This product constrains the Broker so that components are involved in at most one session at a time. We can construct this overall behavior modeling the whole system and analyze it with the Vereofy tool [11, 12] , e.g., to ensure absence of deadlock. Furthermore, Vereofy includes symbolic model checking tools for linear-time, branching-time and alternating-time temporal logics with special operators to reason about the events and data flow at ports of components. Due to lack of space, we do not explain the details of such analyses.
Channels. We can further refine the network model by introducing channels (which are a specific kind of connectors) [1, 13] . In general, a channel provides two (channel)-ends. We distinguish between input-ends (to which a component can write) and output-ends (from which a component can read). We can also describe the synchronization between the two channel-ends by an automaton. For example, the automaton below models a 1-place buffer. It provides an input-end in and an output-end out. In state e the buffer is empty and in state f it is full (for simplicity, we abstract from the data transfered and stored). We model the data-transfer from server j to client i, i.e., the connection between the answer ports, by replacing the synchronization of cAns i and sAns j by the following synchronization with the above 1-place buffer.
The overall behavior of the system is described by the synchronized product of the Broker, the component automata, and the channel automata. The network itself consists of the Broker and the channels. Fig. 5 shows a configuration in which two buffer channels are used as the network connecting the components. The dashed arrows in this figure show port bindings, i.e., the channel-end to which a port is bound. The bold arrows represent the channels. Vereofy can be used also for analyzing complex networks containing Reo channels.
Object-Oriented Modeling
In this section, we model the components in Creol, an executable modeling language. To model the components, we provide interfaces for the intra-component communication and finally a Creol implementation of the components. By adding a Creol implementation for the network manager, we get an executable model of the whole system. Since Creol models are executable we use the terms Creol model and Creol implementation interchangeably.
We use intra-component interfaces together with the behavioral interfaces of Section 2.2 to derive test specifications to check for conformance between the behavioral models and the Creol implementation. We can also use such a specification to simulate the environment of a component while developing the component.
Given a C implementation of the system, we use the behavioral interfaces of Section 2.2 to derive test scenarios to check for conformance between the Creol model and an implementation in an actual programming language. The coverage of these test scenarios is improved by symbolic execution of the Creol implementation.
Finally, we model the real-time aspects of the system using timed automata. In the real-time model, we add scheduling policies to the objects. Here, we check for schedulability, i.e., whether the tasks can be accomplished within their deadlines.
Executable Creol Model
Creol is an executable modeling language suited for distributed systems. Types are separated from classes, instead (behavioral) interfaces are used to type objects. Objects are concurrent, i.e., conceptually, each object encapsulates its own processor. Creol objects can have active behavior, i.e., during object creation a designated run method is invoked.
Creol allows for flexible object interaction based on asynchronous method calls, explicit synchronization points, and underspecified (i.e., nondeterministic) local scheduling of the processes within an object. Creol supports software evolution by means of runtime class updates [14] . This allows for runtime reconfiguration of the components. To facilitate the exogenous coordination of the components we have extended Creol with facades and an event system (cf. Section 2.1).
The modeling language is supported by an Eclipse modeling and analysis environment which includes a compiler and type-checker, a simulation platform based on Maude [15] , which allows both closed world and open world simulation as well as guided simulation, and a graphic display of the simulations.
In the rest of this section, we first specify the interfaces of a local data store for a peer syntactically. Then, we implement parts of a peer as an example.
Each peer consists of a client object, a server object and a data-store object. The Client interface provides the user with a search operation. The data-store provides the client object with an add operation to introduce new data and the server object with a find operation to retrieve data. We model these two perspectives on the data-store by two interfaces StoreClientPerspective and StoreServerPerspective.
The interfaces are structured in terms of inheritance and cointerface requirements. The cointerface of a method (denoted by the with keyword) is a static restriction on the objects that may call the method. In the model, the cointerface reflects the intended user of an interface. In Creol, object references are always typed by interfaces. The caller of a method is available via the implicit variable caller. Specifying a concrete cointerface allows for callbacks. Finally, method parameters are separated into input and output parameters, using in and out keywords, respectively. 1 i n t e r f a c e S t o r e C l i e n t P e r s p e c t i v e begin 2 with C l i e n t 3 op add ( in key : Data , i n f o : Data ) 4 end 6 i n t e r f a c e S t o r e S e r v e r P e r s p e c t i v e begin 7 with S e r v e r 8 op f i n d ( in key : Data ; out i n f o : Data ) 9 end 11 i n t e r f a c e S t o r e 12 i n h e r i t s S t o r e C l i e n t P e r s p e c t i v e , S t o r e S e r v e r P e r s p e c t i v e 13 
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The interfaces cover the intra-component communication while the facades cover the inter-component communication (cf. Section 2.1). To implement a Creol class, we can use only the ports and events specified in the facades. Note that the use of ports is restricted to reading from an inport or writing to an outport. Since the inter-component communication is coordinated exogenously by the network, the components are not allowed to alter the port bindings; instead, they have to raise an event to request a reconfiguration of the communication network structure.
Next, we provide implementation models for the interfaces in terms of Creol classes. The client offers a search method to the user. To perform a search, the client makes a request to the broker. The event openCS<req, ans>(key; found) provides the ports req and ans to be reconfigured, plus the parameters key and found. If the data identified by key is available, the broker connects the given ports to a server holding the data and reports via found the success of the search. Otherwise, the ports are left unchanged and the failure is reported via found. If successful the client expects its ports to be connected properly and communicates the data via its ports.
For simplicity, a client only operates one search at a time. Nevertheless, the user can issue multiple concurrent search requests. The requests are buffered and served in an arbitrary order (due to the nondeterministic scheduling policy) one at a time. To obtain the result of the search, the client uses a synchronous call to the ans port. The update regarding the new data is sent to the data-store asynchronously ! store .add(key, result ). Using asynchronous communication the client can already con-tinue execution while the data-store is busy processing the changes. The client is a passive object, i.e., it does not specify a run method.
c l a s s C l i e n t I m p ( s t o r e : S t o r e C l i e n t P e r s p e c t i v e , r e q : o u t p o r t , ans : i n p o r t )
The server object is active in the sense that it starts its operation upon creation by defining the run method. It repeatedly reads data requests from its req port and reports the results on its ans port.
1 c l a s s ServerImp ( s t o r e : S t o r e S e r v e r P e r s p e c t i v e , r e q : i n p o r t , ans : o u t p o r t ) By raising the event openSS<req,ans>(), a server announces its availability to the broker. This synchronous event returns whenever a request is made for some data on this server. Having provided the ports along the event, the server object expects to be connected to the requesting client, and reads the key to the requested data from its req port. The server looks up the data corresponding to the key in the data-store using the find operation. The result is sent back on the ans port. The event closeSS announces the accomplishment of the transaction. Finally, the server repeats the same process by calling the run method again.
Validation of the Model
Creol programs and models can be executed using the rewriting mechanism in Maude [15] . Maude offers different modes of rewriting and additional capabilities for validation, e.g., a search command and the means for model checking. Credo offers techniques to analyze parts of the system in isolation; on the lowest level, to analyze the behavior of a single (active) object in isolation.
Credo also offers techniques to analyze, in a black-box manner, the behavior of a component modeled in Creol, by interaction via message passing. This allows for both describing and analyzing systems in a divide-and-conquer manner. Thus the developer has the choice of developing the system bottom-up or top-down.
Although Creol allows modeling systems on a high level, the complete model might still be too large to be analyzed or validated as a whole. By building upon the analysis of the individual components, compositional reasoning still allows us to validate the system.
Conformance Testing of the Model
In the context of the Creol concurrency model, especially the asynchrony poses a challenge for validation and testing. Following the black-box methodology, an abstract component specification can be given in terms of its interaction with the environment. However, in a particular execution, the actual order of outputs is-sued from the component may not be preserved, due to the asynchronous nature of communication. To solve this problem, the conformance of the output to the specification is checked only up-to a notion of observability [4] .
The existing Creol interpreter is combined with an interpreter for the abstract behavior specification language to obtain a specification-driven interpreter for testing and validation [4] . It allows a form of run-time assertion checking of the Creolmodels, namely for compliance with the abstract specification.
We can derive a specification for an object directly from the structural interfaces and the behavioral interfaces. The specification of the implementation of the ServerSide can be derived from the facade depicted in Section 2.1 and the behavioral interface depicted in Section 2.2. The facade determines the direction of a communication, i.e., whether it is incoming or outgoing communication. For the specification the direction is inverted -the specification 'interacts' with the object to analyze it. The order of the events is determined by the behavioral interface.
The specification language features, among others, choice (between communication in the same direction, i.e., incoming only or outgoing only) and recursion. As an example, we give the specification of a server:
To test our executable model ServerImpl for conformance with respect to the behavioral interface description, we have to translate this specification to Creol and in the next step to Maude. The specification in Maude is executed together with the model. We can relate the inputs and outputs of the method calls. With the datastore at hand, we can specify via the method parameters that the data delivered along the sAns port of the server is actually the data identified by the key. Though this needs to be done on the level of the Maude code.
The object is executed together with the specification in a special version of the Maude interpreter customized for the testing purpose. The programmer can track down the reason for a problem according to the Maude execution. This can be either a mistake in the executable model or a flaw in the behavioral model, i.e., the specification. The interpreter reports an error if unexpected behavior is observed, i.e., an unspecified communication from the object to the specification, or a deadlock occurs.
Simulation
The conformance testing introduced in the previous section is already a simulation of a part of the system, i.e., the object under test. We can even use a modified version of the above testing interpreter to get rid of the error reporting. Please note that the Maude interpreter of Creol is a set of rewrite rules which reduces the modification of the interpreter in this case to deletion of the rules dealing with the error reporting.
Furthermore we can use the facades and behavioral interfaces of section 2 to derive a Creol skeleton of network. Filling in the details of the network manager we get a Creol model of the network. With the Creol models of the components at hand we get a Creol model of the entire system which can be executed in Maude.
We can use Maude to steer the execution of the model on different levels. We can use the different built-in rewriting strategies, use Maude's search command to search for an execution leading to a designated program state, or use Maude's meta-level to control the details of the execution by controlling the application of the rewrite rules.
With the above simulation strategies, we can use Maude's model-checking facilities. In general, the simulation is non-deterministic, which means, that only part of the specified behavior is covered. Therefore, the user gets to see only part of the wished behavior, or, worse still, unwanted, erroneous behavior is missed. Using Maude's search facility allows to explore the search space systematically. A general limitation of model checkers is the state space explosion, which makes larger systems unmanageable, when it comes to model checking. By analyzing parts of the system in isolation we reduce the state space explosion. Furthermore, Creol as a modeling language allows to represent the system in a high-level, abstract manner, and concentrate on the crucial design-choices, which furthermore increases the chances to be able to model-check such as model. The use of the Maude implementation based on rewriting theory finally helps in dealing with the asynchronous nature of communication: as mentioned, the asynchronicity is represented by some form of equivalence on the traces, which can directly be represented as equivalence in the Maude rewriter. This allows the execution engine to more efficiently represent the state space (by working on the normal forms instead of exploring all re-orderings one by one).
Conformance Testing of the Implementation
We use a formal testing process to provide the necessary links between behavioral interfaces, Creol models, and the actual implementation. Behavioral interfaces provide test scenarios, patterns of interactions between the components. A test case created according to a test scenario represents a functional description, but does not guarantee a good coverage of the model. To optimize the coverage, dynamic symbolic execution is used to analyzes execution paths through the Creol model to find representative test cases while avoiding redundancies in the test suite [5] .
Once a test suite is created, the next step in testing is executing the tests on the implementation and reaching a test verdict to check the conformance between model and implementation. Testing a concurrent system involves validating both functional and nonfunctional aspects. Functional aspects can be covered by standard techniques like runtime assertions in the implementation and unit testing. To test the concurrency behavior of an implementation against its model we use the observation that typically the Creol model and the implementation share a common structure with regard to high-level structure and control flow. It is therefore reasonable to assume that, given equivalent stimuli (input data), they will behave in an equivalent way with regard to control flow. To test this assumption, the implementation is instrumented to record events and use this instrumentation to record traces of observable events, then instrument the model to restrict its execution flow to the recorded trace. If the model can successfully play back the trace recorded 
Schedulability Analysis
In this section, we explain how to model the real-time aspects of the peer-to-peer system using timed automata and the Uppaal model checker [16] . An object or component is called schedulable if it can process all its tasks in time, i.e., within their designated deadlines. We demonstrate the schedulability analysis process [17, 8] on the broker object in the peer-to-peer model, which is the most heavily loaded entity in this system. In the real-time model of an object, we add explicit schedulers to object specifications. For schedulability analysis, the model of an object consists of three parts: the behavioral interface, the methods and the scheduler.
Behavioral interface. To analyze an object in isolation, we use the behavioral interface as an abstract model of the environment. Thus, it triggers the object methods. Fig. 6 shows the behavioral interface of the broker augmented with real-time information. The automata in this figure are derived from the behavioral interface of Peer (in Section 2) by removing the port operations. To send messages, we use the invoke channel, with the syntax invoke[message] [sender ] [ receiver ]! . For specifying the deadlines associated to a message, we use the variable deadline.
In Fig. 6 , we use the open upd and reg upd channels to synchronize the automata for Peer with ClientSide and ServerSide, respectively. Additionally, the automata for ClientSide and ServerSide are synchronized on the oc os channel; this abstractly models the synchronization on port communication between the components in which the broker is not directly involved. This model allows the server side of any peer to be able to match with the client side of any peer (abstracting from the details of matching the peers).
The confirmCS and confirmSS messages model the confirmation sent back from the broker to the open session requests by the peers. In the implementation, this will be an implicit reply which is therefore not modeled in the behavioral interfaces of the peers in Section 2. These edges synchronize with the method implementations (explained next) in order to reduce the nondeterminism in the model. Methods. The methods also use the invoke channel for sending messages. Fig. 7 shows the automata implementation of two methods for handling the openCS and register events. In openCS, and similarly in every method, the keyword caller refers to the object/component that has called this method. The scheduler should be able to start each method and be notified when the method finishes, so that it can start the next method. To this end, method automata start with a synchronization on the start channel, and finish with a transition synchronizing on the finish channel leading back to the initial location. The implementation of the openCS method involves sending a message confirmCS back to the sender, while the register method is modeled merely as a time delay.
Checking Schedulability
When an object is instantiated, an off-the-shelf scheduler can be selected and (possibly) tailored to the particular needs of the object. For an object, one should make a network of timed automata in Uppaal by instantiating the automata templates for methods, behavioral interface and the scheduler. There are two conditions indicating that a system is not schedulable:
(i) The scheduler receives a new message when the message queue is already full. In theory [8] , a schedulable object needs a queue length of at most d max /b min , where d max is the biggest deadline value used and b min is the smallest execution time of all methods.
(ii) The deadline of at least one message in the queue is missed.
In either of the above cases, the scheduler automaton goes to a location called Error. This location has no outgoing transitions and therefore causes deadlock. Therefore, a lack of deadlock implies schedulability, as well as correct output behavior for the object.
Due to the high amount of concurrency in the model, model checking is of limited use. Nevertheless, we can use the simulation feature of Uppaal [18] for analyzing bigger systems. We can measure the worst-case response time for each message, which identifies a lower bound for the deadline value in a schedulable system.
Conclusions
The Credo project has been successful in developing modeling and analysis techniques addressing highly reconfigurable distributed systems. In this paper, we described when and how to use these tools and techniques at the design stage of a software development process. At a high level of abstraction, the dynamic connections between the components are modeled using data-flow networks and verified, e.g., for absence of deadlock. Then an abstract object-oriented model of the implementation is devised in Creol, which has an executable formal semantics. This model can be used for further analysis of functional as well as non-functional properties, e.g., schedulability. The conformance between the object-oriented and dataflow models as well as the conformance between an implementation in a programming language and the Creol model is tested.
The process described in this paper can be integrated in the existing software development methodologies which support component-based modeling, and thus enhance them with support for formal modeling and analysis of dynamically reconfigurable distributed systems. In future, we intend to broaden the scope of the Credo modeling language and its corresponding tool suite in order to support the full development life-cycle of large-scale, open systems. This involves, on one hand, integrating models of software architecture into the process; and on the other hand, working further on deployment concerns such as scheduling.
